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1251 
Our Global Commons 
Brigham Daniels* and James Salzman** 
In January 2014, the BYU Law Review, in partnership with The 
Nature Conservancy, hosted a symposium focused on the global 
commons. First popularized by Garrett Hardin in 1969,1 
environmental, natural resources, and land use scholars quickly realized 
that the dynamic of the commons drives many policy challenges.2 At 
their root, commons problems arise when the unrestricted, collective 
consumption or use of a limited resource leads to depletion or even 
destruction of the resource. In simple terms, actions that seem to make 
individuals better off in the short term ultimately create a mess 
for everyone. 
 
* Professor, Brigham Young University Law School. 
** Donald Bren Distinguished Professor of Environmental Law, University of California – Los 
Angeles Law School and University of California – Santa Barbara Bren School of Environmental 
Science and Management. 
 1.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 2. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory 
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 
ENVTL. L. 515 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global 
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183 (2005); Lee Anne Fennell, Common 
Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907 (2004); Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban 
Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (2011); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the Urban 
Commons, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1995 (2012); Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified 
Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375 
(2011); Blake Hudson & Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to Commons Problems: 
Nested Governance Commons and Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1283 (2013); James E. 
Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL’Y 325, 325 n.3 (1992); 
David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern 
Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. Rev. 241 (2011); Emily C. Powers, Fracking and 
Federalism: Support for an Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 
J.L. & POL’Y 913 (2011); Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); Rose, Ostrom and the Lawyers: The 
Impact of Governing the Commons on the American Legal Academy, 5 INT’L. J. COMMONS 28 
(2011); Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and 
Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2012); Amy Sinden, The 
Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533 
(2007); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 475 (2008); Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the 
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241 (2000); Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons from 
Spindletop to Enron, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 187 (2004). 
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For example, people throughout the United States routinely make 
the decision to drive even when they have the option of walking, biking, 
carpooling, or taking mass transit. While this may make sense for those 
opting to drive, it also contributes to traffic jams and poor air quality. 
To an impressive degree, a host of environmental problems occur 
because they present similar commons dilemmas such as crashing 
wildlife populations decimated by aggressive hunting and fishing; 
pollution problems in our rivers, lakes, and oceans; climate change; 
overgrazing our rangelands; and overharvesting our forests and water 
resources. Indeed, the problem of the commons plays out in one form 
or another in many of our natural world’s important features—ranging 
from deserts and the atmosphere to oceans and forests. 
It is not just the pervasiveness of commons problems that explains 
why the global commons deserve our attention. Understanding the 
commons problem is important because what we learn about one 
commons resource (e.g., a forest) often provides us lessons to help 
manage others (e.g., the global atmosphere). In a complex world, this 
pathway to potential solutions is extremely valuable. 
While environmental law scholarship has explored the commons for 
decades, the genesis for this symposium can be traced back to June 12, 
2012, when the best-known commons scholar—Elinor Ostrom—passed 
away. The symposium was designed to reflect on her seminal work on 
the commons, which often grew out of insights from applying political 
economy to a broad array of environmental and resource challenges. 
Her most renowned work, Governing the Commons, includes case 
studies of rivers in Spain and the Philippines, landscapes in Switzerland, 
forests in Japan, groundwater aquifers in California, and fisheries in 
Turkey, Nova Scotia, and Sri Lanka, among others.3 This work led her 
on a path that ultimately made her the first female recipient of the 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, awarded in 2009. 
The symposium had two goals. The first was to honor Dr. Ostrom 
and her work. The second was to carry her work—and the work of 
many others—forward by furthering our understanding of the 
global commons. 
An engaged and impressive group of scholars helped the symposium 
accomplish both goals. Participants included Zachary Bray, Marcilynn 
Burke, Daniel Cole, Brigham Daniels, Lee Anne Fennell, Eric Freyfogle, 
 
 3. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
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Blake Hudson, Marco Janssen, James Rasband, Carol Rose, Jonathan 
Rosenbloom, James Salzman, Barton Thompson, and 
Hannah Wiseman. 
Carol Rose provided the keynote address for the symposium, which 
was based on her article Surprising Commons.4 Rose argues that in the 
commons, surprises are to be expected. Some surprises arise because of 
the nature of the commons and the people consuming it; for example, 
we do not anticipate the impacts of many consumers each consuming 
the commons in small bites.5 Surprises are not always negative; in fact, 
as the set of things recognized as commons has grown, we have found 
unanticipated applications of lessons about one commons to another 
that seemed completely unrelated.6 Rose also suggests strategies to 
avoid unpleasant surprises without forgoing pleasant surprises.7 In many 
ways, Surprising Commons builds on her work in The Comedy of the 
Commons,8 a landmark in legal scholarship. The Comedy of the Commons, 
while focused on the physical environment, has increasingly become as 
important to intellectual property scholars as it already was to 
environmental policy scholars.9 This is just the sort of surprise that 
Rose’s latest article tells us to anticipate.10 
Seven other participants also contributed articles to this symposium 
issue of the BYU Law Review. Zachary Bray examines the evolution of 
Texas groundwater law in his article Texas Groundwater and Tragically 
 
 4.  Carol Rose, Surprising Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1257 (2014). 
 5. Id. at 1262–70. 
 6. Id. at 1270–73. 
 7. Id. at 1274–1279. 
 8.  Rose, supra note 4. 
 9. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 26, 70 (2004); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public 
Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1333 (2004); James Ming Chen, Biodiversity and Biotechnology: A 
Misunderstood Relation, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 68 (2005); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in 
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 492 
(1998); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 147 (2009); Brett M. 
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 281 (2007); Michal A. Heller, 
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
621 (1998); Daphne Keller, A Gaudier Future That Almost Blinds the Eye, 52 DUKE L.J. 273, 301–
02 (2002); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of 
the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 456, 461, 484 (2001); Clarisa Long, 
Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 628 (2002); Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing 
Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 665 (2010); Henry E. Smith, 
Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 
87 (2007). 
 10.  Rose, supra note 4, at 1270. 
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Stable “Crossovers.”11 In the article, he traces the way in which the Texas 
Supreme Court has adopted oil and gas law in the water law context, 
sometimes with disastrous results. Bray shows how the rigidity found in 
Texas oil and gas law has created a new source of challenges for Texas 
water law.12 This discussion of rigidity in one area infecting another 
body of law provides a new insight in the commons literature.13 
In The Tragicomedy of the Commons,14 Brigham Daniels reconciles 
the different stories told about the commons, which range from comedy 
to tragedy. In doing so, he highlights reasons beyond the tragedy of the 
commons to expect challenges in managing commons resources, even 
when things seemingly are on the right track. His examples range from 
interrelated commons (e.g., a river and a riparian area or a parking lot 
and an adjacent road) to tragic institutions that bias the use of a 
particular commons over time (e.g., a field used exclusively for grazing 
even though it could be ideal for wildlife habitat or recreation). 
Lee Anne Fennell considers the role of commons in her article, 
Agglomerama.15 Urban interaction space, where people and institutions 
come together to produce, consume, and live, can either be synergistic 
and increase social welfare or, conversely, create negative externalities. 
Treating urban interaction spaces as a commons, Fennell explores what 
she calls the “participant assembly problem”—how to maximize the 
benefits from bringing together different and potentially competing uses 
within urban areas. 
Eric Freyfogle, in his article Naming the Tragedy, looks back to 
Hardin’s seminal article16 and questions whether Hardin’s original 
framing of the problem has lulled us into overlooking the real dynamic 
at play in ecological decline. After exploring many of the assumptions 
made in Hardin’s essay, Freyfogle highlights culprits other than 
Hardin’s rational-self interest. Among other likely suspects, Freyfogle 
suggests that externalities of the market-based system,17 fragmentation 
 
 11. Zachary Bray, Texas Groundwater and Tragically Stable “Crossovers,” 2014 BYU L. REV. 
1283 (2014). 
 12. Id. at 1318–26. 
 13. Id. at 1326–28. 
 14. Brigham Daniels, The Tragicomedy of the Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1347 (2014). 
 15. Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1373 (2014). 
 16. Eric Freyfogle, Naming the Tragedy, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1415 (2014). 
 17. Id. at 1423. 
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of property rights,18 and weak communities can serve as important 
drivers of commons mismanagement.19 
Blake Hudson and Mike Hardig apply commons analysis to 
constitutional jurisprudence. In Isolated Wetland Commons and the 
Constitution,20 they use the example of isolated wetlands and the case 
study of Ebenezer Swamp in Alabama to argue that the concept of the 
commons can provide a basis for extending federal regulation under the 
Clean Water Act. They contend that treating isolated wetlands as 
privatized commons resources will satisfy the “substantial effects” test 
relied on by courts for Commerce Clause analysis. 
In Local Governments and Global Commons,21 Jonathan 
Rosenbloom explores the dynamic between local governments and 
global commons. Treating local governments as individual actors, 
similar to the shepherds in Hardin’s classic article, he explains the 
incentives for local governments to act rationally to increase their short-
term economic benefit by increasing atmospheric pollution. He goes 
further, though, and shows why many local governments act 
“irrationally” to reduce their environmental impacts. Ironically, 
Rosenbloom demonstrates how national and international laws often 
prevent local governments from reducing their environmental impacts. 
In Coordinating the Oil and Gas Commons,22 Hannah Wiseman 
applies insights found in the commons to a wide range of problems that 
permeate oil and gas law. The article goes well beyond the typical 
discussions of coordination in this context—i.e., when property owners 
overlying an oil and gas field end up pooling these resources. 
Specifically, her article applies insights from the commons to help us 
understand challenges ranging from conflicts between surface and 
mineral rights holders23 to the many externalities associated with 
hydraulic fracturing. 24 
The breadth of commons issues addressed in the workshop made 
clear just how powerful a method of analysis Elinor Ostrom and other 
 
 18. Id. at 1420–22. 
 19. Id. at 1440. 
 20. Blake Hudson & Mike Hardig, Isolated Wetland Commons and the Constitution, 2014 
BYU L. REV. 1443 (2014). 
 21. Jonathan Rosenbloom, Local Governments and Global Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 
1489 (2014). 
 22.  Hannah Wiseman, Coordinating the Oil and Gas Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 
1543 (2014). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1546–1549. 
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scholars have developed. Participants not only left with a greater 
appreciation of the complexities and the stakes at issue in the commons, 
but also with a resolve to move the work forward. This felt right. After 
all, the work on the commons—particularly the work of Elinor 
Ostrom—is suffused with optimism: that people are clever and capable; 
that people can put their selfishness aside; and that ordinary people can 
come together and solve extraordinary problems. 
 
